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Racial Implications of Metropolitan Land Use Regulation
By BRANDON WONG ∗
Recent work has explored the dynamics of segregation and the
impacts that city planning can have on it. Restrictive zoning and
other regulations may decrease the available housing to minori-
ties and therefore serve to increase racial segregation, despite
being nominally race-blind. I exploit variation in land use reg-
ulations generated by natural differences in geography as an in-
strument for land use regulation stringency and understand its
relationship to investigate whether restrictive land use regulation
increases segregation. The results of analysis, while inconclusive,
indicate land use regulation may have a sizable effect on urban
segregation, but more exploration is needed. Keywords: Land
Use, Segregation, Geography, Urban
Throughout mainstream US political discourse, housing prices relative to in-
comes has become a topic of growing importance, especially with regards to so-
cial equity in urban development. Many conversations revolving around an “af-
fordability crisis” have arisen. These particularly tend to focus on high demand
coastal areas and larger cities (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks, 2005). Through-
out the 2020 Presidential Campaign many candidates bemoaned the high prices
in places such as New York City and San Francisco, citing advocacy and pol-
icy groups concerned especially with increases in real housing prices since the
1970s1. Understanding the causes of increasing housing prices and the impli-
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cations that they have on social outcomes is of great concern to economists.
For example, restrictive housing prices may lead to labor immobility resulting
in increasing income inequality (Ganong and Shoag, 2017; Albouy, Ehrlich and
Liu, 2016), decreasing productivity growth (Hsieh and Moretti, 2019), and even
ecological damage (Johnson, 2001). It is hypothesized by some that increas-
ing distortions in the housing markets have contributed to “secular stagnation”
(Summers, 2014). A lively debate surrounding how to alleviate this problem has
grown with cities like San Francisco enacting rent control policies, while groups
of individuals have banded together to get YIMBY (”Yes In My BackYard”) poli-
cies passed2. Recent work like Mast (2019), Glaeser and Gyourko (2002), and
Glaeser and Ward (2006) paint a picture that restrictive land use regulation and
artificially low supply are the primary driver of high housing prices. However, in
order to properly evaluate urban developmental policy, it is crucial to understand
which group of people are being affected and how they are.
This is a topic of growing interest within the Urban Economics field as new
papers begin to investigate the effects of urban segregation on outcomes. There
is a large breadth of literature that finds strong negative effects from periods of
racial segregation that may increase poverty (Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor, 2007),
crime (Chetty and Hendren, 2018), or reduce intergenerational wealth (Ananat,
2011). Given racially motivated urban policies3 such as redlining in the 20th
century, one of the continuing goals of urban planing has been to target historical
segregation, paying special attention to black-white segregation. However, very
little research serves to contextualize land use policy and its causes. Saiz (2010)
1Selected headlines include ”Top 2020 candidates release housing affordability plans” (NBC
News), ”Will Housing Swing the 2020 Election?” (Bloomberg), and ”How the Democratic Can-
didates Would Tackle the Housing Crisis”
2YIMBY is a play on the development sentiment known as Not In My BackYard which aims
to reduce development. See, for example, Fischel (2001)
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proposes that geographic constraints to elasticity directly contribute to land use
regulations being enacted while Trounstine (2020) draws a political theory of
racially motivated land use regulations for the purposes of segregating commu-
nities which she demonstrates using Fair Use Housing Act lawsuits. Papers like
Rothwell and Massey (2009), Shertzer, Twinam and Walsh (2021), and Caetano
and Macartney (2020) also suggest that land use regulations may be responsible
for increased racial segregation. This paper serves to try and bridge the gap in the
literature about the links between land use regulations and levels of segregation.
I develop a framework for estimating the contemporaneous effects that land
use regulations have on racial segregation levels driven by geographic develop-
ment restrictions. Using geographic information systems (GIS) data, I first show
that geography is a significant predictor of land use regulations as shown in Saiz
(2010). Specifically I aim to answer whether more restrictive land use regulation
increase metropolitan segregation levels between black and white households.
Then I link the segregation measurements to land use regulation through geog-
raphy as an exogenous source of variation in segregation outcomes to provide
the statistical significance of my results. I will be using a dataset constructed of
multiple measures of segregation created using decennial census data, 1990 geo-
graphic measurements and a land use index. I consider a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) model where I use geography as a plausibly exogenous predictor of land
use regulation to assess my hypothesis.
3Santucci (2019) provides an excellent example of racial covenant acting as a strong barrier
barring black households from entering white neighborhoods
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I. Segregation, Geography, and Measurement
A. Segregation
In the context of this paper, segregation is a a systemic racial division of cit-
izens into differing metropolitan neighborhoods and homes. Concentrations of
racial groups are not uncommon in many large metropolitan areas and are some-
times a preferred community, but segregation is generally caused through policy
choices that are deliberate or not. Segregation can also be further exacerbated and
enforced through non-policy mechanisms such as restrictive prices, occupational
licensing, and historic districting. Because segregation is complex and there are
a variety of facets that all require different measurements; it is necessary to look
at multiple indices when attempting to understand segregation levels. There are
a variety of measures that economists typically use to evaluate spatial segrega-
tion. These usually come in the form of various indices that are calculated by
Census tract data and demographic information. Such indices provide a very
rough estimate of racial homogeneity across an area rather than a within-place
neighborhood segregation measure like more sophisticated indices such as those
produced in Logan and Parman (2015). Given the size of the cities that I am
examining, I opt for a widely used segregation index.
In this paper, two common measures of segregation will be used constructed
by economists who have previously studied the relationship between urban de-
velopment and demography (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997). Isolation is primarily
defined by minority group exposure to a majority group, in this case black expo-
sure to white households. For instance if all predominantly black neighborhoods
are clustered in one area of the metropolitan area, isolation is higher as there is
a lack of exposure to white neighborhoods. Measuring the propensity for con-
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tact with majority groups allow us to develop a picture of the racial distribution
of households within a metropolitan area. Isolation is the ratio of populated ar-
eas normalized from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating perfectly even distribution of mi-
nority groups with 1 indicating minority groups having no exposure to majority




























While isolation is useful for measuring absolute relative population, dissim-
ilarity helps to develop a picture of homogeneity of neighborhoods. Using a
dissimilarity index, more diverse households within a given tract is considered
less segregated. If, for example, there is an entirely black neighborhood, next to
an entirely white neighborhood, next to an entirely Hispanic neighborhood, this
tract would have a higher dissimilarity index regardless of the population levels
of each corresponding groups. Dissimilarity us a good complement to isolation
by moving to relative magnitudes in a population rather than a relative distri-
bution. Similar to isolation, dissimilarity is normalized on a scale from 0 to 1.










For all calculations i is the unit area of interest, in this case neighborhoods, with
4In this paper, highly isolated is greater than .6, moderately isolated is from .3 to .6, and low
isolation is less than .3. These same buckets apply for the dissimilarity index following.
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black, white, non-black, being the number of the corresponding race within the
population of the area examined. For a more intuitive view of each of the in-
dices used, refer to Figures 7 and 8 for images taken from Weinberg and Stein-
metz (2002). It should be clear that both of these two segregation indices tend
to correlate relatively strongly with each other as shown in Figure 1. However,
many cities that have a low isolation index, may actually end up having very un-
even distribution which still makes them relatively segregated. For example, San
Francisco in 1990 had an isolation index of .2638 but a much higher dissimilarity
score of .5771.
B. Geography
Importantly, over short to medium time horizons, geography is a statistically
significant predictor of land use regulations, which I will be measuring using
the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI) from Gyourko,
Hartley and Krimmel (2019). This index is normalized with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1 with higher values indicating higher levels of regulation.
One pitfall of this index is that it does not describe the type of regulation that
each MSA has, in fact, the most highly regulated areas using this metric tend to
have multiple dimensions of regulation in land use. The index combines local
political pressure, state involvement, court involvement, rates of approval, and
other forms of regulatory pressures.
Geographic data will come from Saiz (2010) using GIS software to gather in-
formation on baseline development guidelines that create geographic constraints
on urban sprawl. To begin, I generally am most interested in dense urban areas
and my sample constains MSAs with populations greater than 50000 residents.
While this does decrease my sample size down to around 300 metropolitan ar-
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eas, it allows for a narrower view of segregation dynamics. It also happens to be
the case that larger cities will have more heterogeneity in land use regulations,
allowing us to get more significant results as seen in Figure 2. Once I have my
list of MSAs I have measures of developable area using the GIS data.
Typical real estate guidelines restrict development in areas with elevation in-
creases greater than 15% per 50 kilometre (km) radii. As the 50 km distance
is a simple radii for the rest of the geographic measurements, all other arcGIS
data including percentage of area that is water will be based around this value.
The rest of the geography data is structured around the Land Area Baseline as
a percentage of each 50 km radii that is non-ocean. Land area that cannot be
developed on will be subtracted from this value including wooded, herbaceous,
and emergent wetlands. Following is the methodology for calculating the land
unavailable for development:









Where γi the sum of area that is Open Water, Wooded Wetlands, and Emergent
Wetlands. All this combines to develop a picture of metropolitan geography
unavailable for development to used in estimation of housing supply elasticity
using exogenous features.
II. Empirical Methodology and Summary Statistics
Upon combining the segregation and geographic data sets, we are left with 229
cities assigned by Metropolitan Statistical Area code. There is quite a long right-
hand tail of the population sizes in 1990 of each of the cities with many of them
having 800,000 or more citizens. Interestingly, the WRLURI follows a very sim-
ilar distribution which corresponds with the claim that land use regulations are
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strongly tied to geographic constraints on development. There are shown in Fig-
ures and with relevant statistics reported in Table 1. The WRLURI shows a very
illuminating pattern about large cities. The mean was -.1591 which puts them
well below the bottom quartile of regulation based on the WRLURI’s construc-
tion of 0 as the mean. This means that, in general, big cities tend to be more
restrictive than the rest of the areas included in the total WRLURI data. How-
ever, we also see great heterogeneity in city regulation with some cities reaching
the top 1% in regulatory slack, which is indicated by the large standard devia-
tion. Geographically, the cities in the US are even more heterogeneous with a
strong skew towards being developable. The mean city has about 25% of land
unavailable for development with a standard deviation of approximately 21%.
However, the most common values were trivially close to 0 which indicates that
the majority of cities are not extremely geographically constrained.
With respect to segregation, I matched the 1990 population data with the same
years’ segregation indices. I also included 1950s segregation indices for compari-
son, although there are far fewer reported observations. It is worth noting that the
mean isolation level in 1990 observed was .2829 with dissimilarity much higher
at .5741. This corroborates with the idea that cities which may still have relatively
diverse populations siphon households into specific neighborhoods. Besides the
observations that have them close to 0, both of the distributions of the segregation
indices appear relatively normally distributed, albeing with differing means. In
accordance with Saiz (2010), as elasticity goes up, the WRLURI goes down.
To estimate the connection between land use regulation and segregation I adopt
the following reduced form model:
(4) Segregation = β0 +β1USEi +β2πi +β3Xi + εi
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Where USE is our land use measurement for each MSA, i. πi is an elasticity value
for each corresponding MSA and Xi are a population controls. In a final regres-
sion, I include a control for 1950s segregation which shows that past segregation
is a statistically significant. However, due to the lack of data having both 1990
isolation and 1950 isolation leaves us with only 53 observations making any in-
ferences impossible due to possibly spurious results. Then my 2SLS model uses
the following first-stage equation:
(5) USEi = α0 +α1UNAVAILi +α2πi +β3Xi + εi
Where UNAVAIL denotes the percentage of land that is unavailable for develop-
ment as outlined in equation (3) and the rest of the estimators are the same as
in equation (4). All observations are weighted by MSA population. As a dis-
cussion about the validity of using geography as an instrument, Davidoff (2016)
is of importance here. Critically, Davidoff argues that building costs associated
with physically constrained development are not a strong supply constraint, mak-
ing geography an invalid instrument for home prices. However, this model uses
physical constraints as an instrument for zoning rather than physical supply and
building. This implies that demand can only be met by building at the suburban
fringe rather than throughout the metropolitan area. Since it has already been
shown that geography is a robust predictor for zoning we include supply in the
form of elasticity in the right hand side of our estimating equation.
III. Results and Conclusions
All forms of the 2SLS regressions are reported in Table 2 with every column
first showing effects on isolation, then for dissimilarity. The results of my first
two models indicate that land use has a relatively large effect on both isolation
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and dissimilarity. However, these results are not statistically significant with re-
ported p-values just missing the 90% confidence level4. It is likely that this is
due to the low number of observations in my dataset that result in relatively high
standard errors. Since the confidence interval is large, it is impossible to reject
the null hypothesis. However, these results are helpful to understand the direc-
tion and magnitude of the effect. I see that, on average, the marginal effect of
an increase in land use regulation has increases the isolation index by 0.07419.
Since the index goes from 0-1, this is quite a large effect moving many cities
from a lower quintile to the next of regulatory burden. These results also show
much smaller increase for dissimilarity of 0.0234568, which is likely a result of
the mean dissimilarity of urban areas being quite high to begin with. Importantly,
the population estimates are functionally equivalent to 0. This indicates that for
the cities, the effects of land use regulation on segregation levels is not dependent
on the size of the city.
My second regression results reports in Table 3 only contain results on isola-
tion. The first columns includes the effects of earlier segregation on the right
hand side. It brings the coefficient on land use within a 90% confidence inter-
val despite also dramatically decreases the size of it. Because the observations
have also decreased, it is difficult to understand how including this effect would
shape our overall structural model. I also include regressions with observations
weighted by population size rather then including them as a fixed effect. Here we
see statistically significant effects that are even larger. This suggests that there
my initial results may still carry information about the effects on segregation
There are also included threats to validity of my analysis which may result from
omitted variable bias. More specifically, I would have liked to have access to
4My reported p-values for the first two models are .149 and .174 respectively
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neighborhood socioeconomic demographic data, average building height or lot
size, and other neighborhood level variables that may have given more insight
into the specific makeup and migration patterns of the neighborhoods. However,
due to privacy concerns, these are not provided.
The results of this analysis are inconclusive given the statistical significance of
my estimators. However, this is likely a result of the relatively low number of
cities accounted for since these were the only ones that I had geography data on.
This selection effect means that I am only accounting for cities who have both
been geographically examined and had a relevant segregation index calculated
for. Despite these issues present in the data, We can interpret the preliminary
findings to be similar to what other studies have found regarding land use policy
and its effects on demographic change which still makes it informative. There
is a strong suggestion that more restrictive land use policies within metropolitan
areas may serve to increase segregation within those areas. Further research into
the nature of this relationship should be conducted using more data as the spatial
inferences from this paper may not encapsulate all dynamics that result from
regulation and movement.
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IV. Tables and Figures
TABLE 1—SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS
mean sd min max count
Population 834930.1 1303451 57661 9546597 229
Unavailable .2507299 .2126945 .0045698 .8601149 229
Housing Supply Elasticity 2.544065 1.465981 .5952661 12.14801 229
WRLURI -.159097 .7602786 -1.764706 3.121081 229
Isolation, 1990 .282945 .1920674 .0053978 .7625341 228
Dissimilarity, 1990 .5741036 .127768 .2659263 .8727628 228
Observations 229













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDICES
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FIGURE 7. SOURCE: WEINBERG AND STEINMETZ (2002)
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FIGURE 8. SOURCE: WEINBERG AND STEINMETZ (2002)
